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ABSTRACT 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) are self-configuring networks of mobile nodes connected by wireless links. These 
nodes are able to move randomly and organize themselves and thus, the network's wireless architecture change rapidly 
and unpredictably. MANETs are usually utilized in situations of emergency for temporary operations or when there are no 
resources to set up elaborate networks. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks operate in the absence of any fixed infrastructure, which 
makes them easy to deploy, at the same time however, due to the absence of any fixed infrastructure, it becomes difficult 
to make use of the existing routing techniques for network services, and this poses a number of challenges in ensuring the 
security of the communication network, something that is not easily done as many of the demands of network security 
conflict with the demands of mobile networks due to the nature of the mobile devices (e.g. low power consumption, low 
processing load). Most of the ad-hoc routing protocols that address security issues rely on implicit trust relationships to 
route packets among participating nodes. Apart from security objectives like authentication, availability, confidentiality, and 
integrity, the ad-hoc routing protocols should also address location confidentiality, cooperation fairness and absence of 
traffic diversion. In this paper we attempt to survey security issues faced by the mobile ad-hoc network environment and 
provide a classification of the various security mechanisms. We also analyzed the respective strengths and vulnerabilities 
of the existing routing protocols and proposed a broad and comprehensive frame-work that can provide a tangible 
solution. 
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1.    INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, the explosive growth of mobile computing devices, which mainly include laptops, personal digital 
assistants (PDAs) and handheld digital devices, has caused a revolutionary change in the computing world: computing will 
not merely rely on the capability provided by the personal computers, and the concept of ubiquitous computing emerges 
and becomes one of the research hotspots in the computer science society [1]. In the ubiquitous computing environment, 
individual users utilize, at the same time, several electronic platforms through which they can access all the required 
information whenever and wherever they may be [2]. The nature of the ubiquitous computing has made it necessary to 
adopt wireless network as the interconnection method: it is not possible for the ubiquitous devices to get wired network link 
whenever and wherever they need to connect with other ubiquitous devices. The Mobile Ad Hoc Network is one of the 
wireless networks that have attracted most concentrations from many researchers. 
A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a system of wireless mobile nodes that dynamically self-organize in arbitrary and 
temporary network topologies. Individuals and vehicles can thus be inter-connected in areas without a pre-existing 
communication infrastructure or when the use of such infrastructure requires wireless extension [3]. In themobile ad hoc 
network, nodes can directly communicate with all the other nodes within their radio ranges; whereas nodes that are not in 
the direct communication range use intermediate node’s to communicate with each other. In these two situations, all the 
nodes that have participated in the communication automatically form a wireless network, therefore this kind of wireless 
network can be viewed as mobile ad hoc network 
2    OVERVIEW OF MANET 
Ad-hoc  networks are a new technology of wireless communication for mobile hosts. There is no fixed Infrastructure such 
as base transceiver stations for mobile switching. Nodes within each other’s radio range are able to communicate directly 
through  wireless links. Nodes which are not within each other’s radio range rely on other nearby nodes to relay 
messages. The wireless nature of communication and lack of any security infrastructure leads to several network security 
vulnerabilities. Figure 1 shows a comparison between an’ infrastructure ‘cellular network and a ‘non- infrastructure’ mobile 
ad hoc network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Comparison Between Cellular Network and MANET 
In ad-hoc networks information packets are transmitted in a store-and-forward manner from a source to the destination, 
through intermediate nodes as shown in Figure 2. As the nodes roam, the resulting change in network topology must be 
relayed  to the other nodes so that outdated topology information can be updated or deleted. For example, as N2 in Figure 
2 changes its point of attachment from N3 to N4 other nodes part of the network should use this new route to forward 
packets to N2. 
Note that in Figure  2, we assume that it is not possible to have all nodes within range of each other. In case all nodes are 
close-by within radio range, there are no routing issues to be addressed. In real situations, the power needed to obtain 
complete connectivity may be, at least, infeasible, not to mention issues such as battery life. Therefore, we are interested 
in scenarios where only few nodes are within radio range of each other. Figure  2 raises another issue of symmetric (bi-
directional) and asymmetric (unidirectional) links. Some of the protocols we discuss consider symmetric links with 
associative radio range, i.e., if (in Figure 2) N1 is within radio range of N3, then N3 is also within radio range of N1. This is 
to say that the communication links are symmetric. Although this assumption is not always valid, it is usually made 
because routing in asymmetric networks is a relatively hard task. In certain cases, it is possible to find routes that could 
avoid asymmetric links, since it is quite likely that these links imminently fail. Unless stated otherwise, throughout this text 
we consider symmetric links, with all nodes having identical capabilities and responsibilities. 
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Fig 2: A Mobile Ad-hoc Network 
The mobile ad-hoc network has the following typical features [4]: unreliability of wireless links between nodes, constantly 
changing topology, bandwidth-constrained variable capacity links, power constrained operation, limited physical security, 
autonomous and infrastructure-less, multi-hop routing, variation in link and node capacities, network scalability. Due to 
these features, the mobile ad-hoc networks are more prone to network vulnerabilities than the traditional wired networks. 
Thus, the need to pay more attention to the security issues in mobile ad-hoc networks. 
3   MANETS SECURITY ATTACKS AND VULNERABILITY 
3.1   WHY MANETS ARE VULNERABLE 
Because mobile ad hoc networks are more susceptible to attacks than the traditional wired networks, security is much 
more difficult to handle in the mobile ad hoc network than in the wired network. In this section, we will discuss the various 
vulnerabilities that exist in the mobile adhoc networks, which are as follows: 
I. Absence Of Secure Boundaries 
 There is no clear secure boundary in the mobile ad hoc network, as there is in the traditional wired network. Lack of 
secure boundaries makes the mobile ad hoc network susceptible to various attacks. The attacks mainly include passive 
eavesdropping, data tampering, active interfering and leakage of secret information, message contamination, message 
replay and denial of service. 
II. Threat From Compromised Nodes Within The Network 
Mobile nodes are autonomous units that can join or leave the network at will, it is difficult for the nodes themselves to work 
out some effective policies to prevent the possible malicious behaviors from all the nodes it communicate with because of 
the inherent diversity of different nodes. Also, because of the mobility of the ad hoc network, compromised node can 
frequently change its attack target and perform malicious behavior to different node in the network. Therefore, threats from 
compromised nodes inside the network are far more dangerous than the attacks from outside the network, and these 
attacks are much harder to detect because they come from the compromised nodes, which behave well before they are 
compromised [5]. 
III. Lack Of A Central Management Facility 
Ad hoc networks do not have a centralized piece of management machinery which lead to some vulnerability problems. 
Now let us analyze this problem in a more detailed manner. 
First of all, the absence of centralized management machinery makes the detection of attacks a very difficult problem 
because it is not easy to monitor the traffic in a highly dynamic and large scale ad hoc network [6]. Secondly, lack of 
centralized management machinery will negatively affect the trust management for the nodes in the ad hoc network. In 
mobile ad hoc network, all the nodes are required to cooperate in the network operation, while no security association 
(SA2) can be assumed for all the network nodes. Thus, it is not practical to perform an a priori classification, and as a 
result, the usual practice of establishing a line of defense, which distinguishes nodes as trusted and non-trusted, cannot 
be achieved here in the mobile ad hoc network. Finally, some algorithms in the mobile ad hoc network rely on the 
cooperative participation of all nodes. Because there is no centralized decision making infrastructure, the attacker can 
make use of this vulnerability and perform some attacks that can break the cooperative algorithm. 
IV. Unreliable Wireless Links Between Nodes 
Because of the limited energy supply for the wireless nodes and the mobility of the nodes, the wireless links between 
mobile nodes in the ad hoc network are not consistent for the communicating participants. 
V. Scalability (Dynamic Topology) 
We need to address the scalability problem when we discuss the vulnerabilities in the mobile ad hoc network [4]. Unlike 
the traditional wired network in that its scale is generally predefined when it is designed and will not change much during 
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the use, the scale of the ad hoc network keeps changing all the time: because of the mobility of the nodes in the mobile ad 
hoc network, you can hardly predict how many nodes there will be in the network in the future. As a result, the protocols 
and services that are applied to the ad hoc network such as routing protocol and key management service should be 
compatible to the continuously changing scale of the ad hoc network, which may range from decades of nodes to 
hundreds of nodes, or even thousands of nodes. In other words, these protocols and services need to scale up and down 
efficiently. 
VI. Restricted Power Supply 
Some or all of the nodes in a mobile adhoc network may rely on batteries or other exhaustible means for their energy. For 
these nodes, the most important system design criteria for optimization may be energy conservation. The problem that 
may be caused by the restricted power supply is denial-of-service attack [4]. Since the attacker knows that the target node 
is battery-restricted, it can either continuously send additional packets to the target, or it can induce the target to be 
trapped in some kind of time-consuming computation. In this way the battery power of the target node will be exhausted by 
these meaningless tasks, and thus the target node will be out of service to all the benign service requests since it has run 
out of battery power. 
3.2   Attacks On Manets Protocol Stacks 
MANET protocol stack attacks include the following: 
I. Physical Layer Attacks 
a. Eavesdropping- Signals broadcast over airwaves can be easily intercepted with receivers tuned to the proper 
frequency. 
b. Jamming- Powerful transmitter with random noise and pulse. 
c. Impersonating- Fake messages can be injected into network. 
II. Link Layer Attacks 
a. Disruption on MAC- A selfish or malicious node could interrupt either contention-based or reservation-based MAC 
protocols. 
III. Network Layer Attacks 
a. Wormhole attack- An attacker records packets at one location in the network and tunnels them to another location [9]. 
b. Black hole attack- First the node exploits the mobile ad hoc routing protocol, such as AODV [12], to advertise itself as 
having a valid route to a destination node. Second, the attacker consumes the intercepted packets without any forwarding. 
c. Routing messages flooding attack- Examples are hello flooding, RREQ flooding, Ack flooding, 
d. Resource consumption attack- An attacker can attempt to consume battery life by requesting excessive route discovery, 
or by forwarding unnecessary packets to the victim node. 
e. Location disclosure attack- It gathers the node location information, such as a route map, and then plans further attack 
scenarios. 
IV. Transport Layer Attacks 
a. SYN flooding attack- The attacker creates a large number of half opened TCP connections with a victim node, but never 
completes the handshake to fully open the connection. During the attack, a malicious node sends a large amount of SYN 
packets to a victim node, spoofing the return addresses of the SYN packets. 
b. Session hijacking- The attacker spoofs the victim’s IP address, determines the correct sequence number that is 
expected by the target, and then performs a DoS attack on the victim. Thus the attacker impersonates the victim node and 
continues the session with the target. 
V.   Application Layer Attacks 
a. Repudiation attack 
b. Data corruption- The application layer contains user data, and it normally supports many protocols such as HTTP, 
SMTP, and FTP. Malicious code, which includes viruses and worms, is applicable across operating systems and 
applications. 
VI.   Multi-Layer Attacks 
a. Denial of Service (DOS)- Another type of packet forwarding attack is the denial of service (DOS) attack via network-
layer packet blasting, in which the attacker injects a large amount of junk packets into the network. These packets waste a 
significant portion of the network resources, and introduce severe wireless channel contention and network congestion in 
the mobile ad hoc network. 
b. Impersonation attacks- A malicious node can precede an attack by altering its MAC or IP address. 
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c. Man-in-the-middle attacks- An attacker sits between the sender and the receiver and sniffs any information being sent 
between two ends. 
4  COUNTER-MEASURES TO THE SECURITY CHALLENGES 
So far we have discussed the various vulnerabilities in the Mobile Ad-hoc Network. Our aim is not just to point out these 
vulnerabilities but to also discuss working solutions to the security attacks caused by these vulnerabilities in this network. 
In this section, we look into some security schemes that can be useful to protect the mobile ad hoc network from malicious 
attackers. 
4.1   Security Attributes 
Security level of mobile ad-hoc networks can be analyzed by using the following indices: 
I. Availability- The term Availability means that a node should maintain its ability to provide all the designed services 
regardless of the security state of it [4]. This attribute is affected by Denial of Service (DOS). 
II. Integrity- Integrity guarantees the identity of the message when they are transmitted. Integrity can be compromised 
mainly in two ways [7]; Malicious altering and  Accidental altering. A message can be removed, replayed or revised by an 
adversary with malicious goal, which is regarded as malicious altering; on the contrary, if the message is lost or its content 
is changed due to some benign failures, which may be transmission errors in communication or hardware errors such as 
hard disk failure, then it is categorized as accidental altering. 
III. Confidentiality- This means that certain information is only accessible to those who have been authorized to access it. 
IV. Authenticity- Authenticity is essentially assurance that participants in the communication network are genuine and not 
impostors [4]. It is necessary for the communication participants to prove their identities as what they have claimed using 
some techniques so as to ensure the authenticity. 
V. Authorization- Authorization is a process in which an entity is issued a credential, which specifies the privileges and 
permissions it has and cannot be falsified by the certificate authority. 
VI. Anonymity- Anonymity means that all the information that can be used to identify the owner or the current user of the 
node should, by default, be kept private and not be distributed by the node itself or the system software. This criterion is 
closely related to privacy preserving, in which we should try to protect the privacy of the nodes from arbitrary disclosure to 
any other entities. 
4.2    Approaches to Ensuring Network Security 
There are basically two approaches to securing a mobile ad-hoc network: The proactive approach attempts to thwart 
security threats in the first place, typically through various cryptographic techniques. On the other hand, the reactive 
approach seeks to detect threats a posteriori and react accordingly. Each approach has its own merits and is suitable for 
addressing different issues in the entire domain. For example, most secure routing protocols adopt the proactive approach 
in order to secure routing messages exchanged between mobile nodes, while the reactive approach is widely used to 
protect packet forwarding operations [8]. 
4.2.1   Defense Method Against Wormhole Attacks 
Wormhole attack is a threatening attack against routing protocol of the mobile ad-hoc networks [9]. In the wormhole attack 
an attacker records bits (or packets) at one point in the network, selectively tunnels them to another location and replays 
them from there into the network. The replay of the information will make great confusion to the routing issue in mobile ad 
hoc network because the nodes that get the replayed packets cannot distinguish it from the genuine routing packets. A 
packet leash is a general mechanism for detecting and, thus defending against wormhole attacks. A leash is any 
information that is added to a packet designed to restrict the packet’s maximum allowed transmission distance. There are 
two main leashes, which are geographical leashes and temporal leashes. A geographical leash ensures that the recipient 
of the packet is within a certain distance from the sender. A temporal leash ensures that the packet has an upper bound 
on its lifetime, which restricts the maximum travel distance, since the packet can travel almost at the speed-of-light. Either 
type of leash can prevent the wormhole attack, because it allows the receiver of a packet to detect if the packet traveled 
further than the leash allows. 
A geographical leash in conjunction with a signature scheme (a signature providing no repudiation) can be used to catch 
the attackers that pretend to reside at multiple locations: when a legitimate node overhears the attacker claiming to be in 
different locations that would only be possible if the attacker could travel at a velocity above the maximum node velocity v,  
the legitimate node can use the signed locations to convince other legitimate nodes that the attacker is malicious.  
Temporal leashes use TIK protocol that implements authentication for broadcast communication in wireless network.TIK 
stands for TESLA with instant key disclosure, and is an extension of the TESL protocol [10]. When used in conjunction 
with precise timestamps and tight clock synchronization, TIK can prevent wormhole attacks that cause the signal to travel 
a distance longer than the nominal range of the radio, or any other range that might be specified. The TIK protocol has 
been proved to be efficient since it requires just public keys in a network with nodes, and has relatively modest storage, 
per packet size, and computation overheads. 
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4.2.2   Defense Against Blackholes Attacks 
Security-Aware Routing Protocol (SAR) is used. A security metric or trust level added into the RREQ. In the intermediate 
nodes if trust level is satisfied the node will process the RREQ. The destination generates RREP with the specific security 
metric. To prevent identity theft stronger access control mechanism is required. In black hole attack, a malicious node 
uses its routing protocol in order to advertise itself for having the shortest path to the destination node or to the packet it 
wants to intercept. This hostile node advertises its availability of fresh routes irrespective of checking its routing table. In 
this way attacker node will always have the availability in replying to the route request and thus intercept the data packet 
and retain it. There indeed have been numerous attempts published in the literature that aim at countering the Black-hole 
attacks. We survey them in the following. In [11], the authors discuss an approach in which the requesting node waits for 
the responses including the next hop details, from other neighboring nodes for a predetermined time value. After the 
timeout value, it first checks in the CRRT (Collect Route-Reply Table) table, whether there is any repeated next-hop-node 
or not. If any repeated next-hop-node is present in the reply paths, it assumes the paths are correct or the chance of 
malicious paths is limited. The solution adds a delay and the process of finding repeated next hop is an additional 
overhead. In [12], the authors discuss a protocol that requires the intermediate nodes to send RREP message along with 
the next hop information. When the source nodes get this information, it sends a RREQ to the next hop to verify that the 
target node (i.e the node that just sent back the RREP packet) indeed has a route to the intermediate node and to the 
destination. When the next hop receives a Further-Request, it sends a Further-Reply which includes the check result to 
the source node. Based on information in Further-Reply, the source node judges the validity of the route. In this protocol, 
the RREP control packet is modified to contain the information about next hop. After receiving RREP, the source node will 
again send RREQ to the node specified as next hop in the received RREP. Obviously, this increases the routing overhead 
and end-to-end delay. In addition, the intermediate node needs to send RREP message twice for a single route request. In 
[13], the authors describe a protocol in which the source node verifies the authenticity of a node that initiates RREP by 
finding more than one route to the destination. When source node receives RREPs, if routes to destination shared hops, 
source node can recognize a safe route to destination puts some overhead in one or either intermediate and destination 
nodes in one or other way. 
4.2.3   Watchdog And Path-Rater 
Watchdog and Path-rater are two main components of a system that tries to improve performance of ad hoc networks in 
the presence of disruptive nodes, the specific working principles of which are discussed below [14].  
Watchdog determines misbehavior by copying packets to be forwarded into a buffer and monitoring the behavior of the 
adjacent node to these packets. Watchdog promiscuously snoops to decide if the adjacent node forwards the packets 
without modifications or not. If the packets that are snooped match with the observing node’s buffer, then they are 
discarded; whereas packets that stay in the buffer beyond a timeout period without any successful match are flagged as 
having been dropped or modified. The node responsible for forwarding the packet is then noted as being suspicious. If the 
number of violations becomes greater than a certain predetermined threshold, the violating node is marked as being 
malicious. Information about malicious nodes is passed to the Path-rater component for inclusion in path rating evaluation. 
Path-rater on an individual node works to rate all of the known nodes in a particular network with respect to their 
reliabilities. Ratings are made, and updated, from a particular node’s perspective. Nodes start with a neutral rating that is 
modified over time based on observed reliable or unreliable behavior during packet routing. Nodes that are observed by 
watchdog to have misbehaved are given an immediate rating of -100. It should be distinguished that misbehavior is 
detected as packet mishandling/modification, whereas unreliable behavior is detected as link breaks. It is shown from the 
experiments that these two components can well reflect the reliability of the nodes based on their packet forwarding 
performances. 
4.2.4   Localize Self-Healing Approach 
The concept of “self-healing community” is based on the observation that wireless packet forwarding typically relies on 
more than one immediate neighbor to relay packets. Community-based security explores node redundancy at each 
forwarding step so that the conventional per-node based forwarding scheme is seamlessly converted to a new per- 
community based forwarding scheme. Since a self-healing community is functional as long as there is at least one 
cooperative “good” node in the community, there is no requirement that how many nodes in the community should be 
available to provide reliable packet forwarding services. There are one configuration and one reconfiguration protocol that 
can respectively be used to initially set up the self-healing community and fix the community if there is a shape loss due to 
the mobility or change of topology [15]. 
4.2.5   Secure Message Transmission 
A protocol, which, given a topology view of the network determines a set of diverse paths connecting the source and the 
destination nodes. Then, it introduces limited transmission redundancy across the paths, by dispersing a message into N 
pieces, so that successful reception of any M-out-of-N pieces allows the reconstruction of the original message at the 
destination. Each piece, equipped with a cryptographic header that provides integrity and replay protection along with 
origin authentication and is transmitted over one of the paths. Upon reception of a number of pieces, the destination 
generates an acknowledgement informing the source of which pieces, and thus routes, were intact. In order to enhance 
the robustness of the feedback mechanism, the small-sized acknowledgments are maximally dispersed (i.e., successful 
reception of at least one piece is sufficient) and are protected by the protocol header as well. If less than M pieces were 
ISSN 2319-1236 
 
 
81 | P a g e                                                               J u l y ,  2 0 1 3  
received, the source retransmits the remaining pieces over the intact routes. If too few pieces were acknowledged or too 
many messages remain outstanding, the protocol adapts its operation, by determining a different path set, re-encoding 
undelivered messages and re-allocating pieces over the path set. Otherwise, it proceeds with subsequent message 
transmissions [16]. 
5  SOLUTIONS TO ATTACKS ON PROTOCOL STACKS 
(a) SLSP (Secure Link State Protocol): This protocol [17] provides secure proactive topology discovery .It is responsible 
for securing the route discovery and distribution of link state information. This protocol is robust against Dos and Byzantine 
adversaries. But this protocol is still vulnerable to colluding attackers and other attackers.  
(b) SEAD (Secure Efficient Adhoc Distance Vector Routing Protocol): It is [18] based on DSDV routing protocol. This 
protocol is used to guard against Denial of Service by using one way hash functions. It provides limited CPU processing 
capability. Long lived routing loops can be reduced by using destination sequence numbers. These destination sequence 
numbers provide replay protection of routing update messages in SEAD.  
(c) SAODV(Secure AODV): It is an enhancement over AODV [19] routing protocol that utilizes security feature like integrity 
and authentication. It uses digital signature to authenticate non mutable field of messages and hash chains to secure hop 
count information. IPSec provides secure network transmission in MANET for data messages. And digital signature is 
used when a RREQ is sent between source node to destination node. Primarily sender node signs the message and 
intermediate node verifies the signature before generating of reverse route to the host. And destination node signs the 
RREP to its private key.  
(d) CONFIDANT (Cooperation of nodes fairness in dynamic adhoc network): This algorithm [20] is enhancement of DSR 
routing and based on selection of selfish and unselfish nodes. Trust and routing calculation process is evaluated by 
experience, observation and behavior of other nodes, present in the network. It identifies routing misbehavior and 
maintains the provision of correct forwarding and traffic diversion.  
(e) ARAN (Authenticated Routing for Adhoc Networks): ARAN[21] is on demand secure routing protocol an it relies on 
digital certificates. By using certificate process, it provides authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation. Thus it 
provides end to end guarantee during message delivery between source and destination. ARAN is capable of defending 
itself against spoofing, fabrication, modification, DoS and disclosure attacks. This protocol does not perform well when it is 
authenticated by selfish node itself and it also leads to wastage of bandwidth.  
(f) ARIADNE: It is secure on [22] demand routing protocol and it is based on TESLA concept. TESLA is an efficient 
authentication scheme that requires loose time synchronization. Firstly it verifies route authenticity and secondly it checks 
that no node is missing on RREQ message. It is vulnerable to an attacker that happens to be along the discovered route. 
This routing can authenticate any three schemes: (i) Shared secrets between each pair of nodes (ii) Shared secrets 
between communicating nodes combined with broadcast authentication or digital signatures. Ariadne needs the security 
association between the initiator every node including intermediate node and the source node. ARIADNE prevents 
attackers with uncompromised routes and also prevents many types of Denial-of-Service attacks. But it cannot defend 
against active 1-1 attack.  
(g) ENDAIRA: It is an improved version [23] of ARIADNE and provides solution where ARIADNE fails. It is based on 
provision on public key system concept. But it cannot defend against man in middle attack. So further there is introduced 
another secure on demand routing protocol known as ENDIARA Loc.  
(h) ENDAIRALoc: This protocol provides solution over man in middle attack as well as wormhole attack. It uses location 
information of node to resist this attack. It uses pair wise secret keys i.e. symmetric key mechanism rather than public key 
mechanism. As a result, energy consumption reduces effectively.  
(i) PrAODV: It is an enhancement of an AODV [24] routing. It uses prediction based routing to reduce route breakages 
which improves the performance. It maintains two additional parameter in RREP message of AODV such as velocity and 
location information. These parameters help to calculate predicted link value by which source node can easily predict 
lifetime of a node.  
(j) CORE: Michiardi and Molva has introduced this approach [25]. Suggested algorithm relies on DSR routing. It follows 
reputation mechanism for monitoring of the cooperativeness of nodes. This mechanism uses the nodes’ reputation to 
forward packets through reliable nodes.  
(k) SAR: It is an extension of AODV [26] routing protocol. This protocol considers trust level mechanism to take efficient 
and secure routing decision. In this a node can find a path through nodes with a particular shared key. It shares symmetric 
encryption key concept among the nodes. SAR increase overhead due to calculation of encryption and decryption process 
at each node. It can be implemented using any routing protocol.  
(l) BISS (Building Secure Routing out of an Incomplete Set of Security Associations) [27]: In this only the destination has 
security associations established with all nodes on the selected route. The sender will authenticate route nodes directly 
through security associations and indirectly the nodes which it does not have security associations. The suggested 
algorithm reduces length ratio. Authentication process can be done by using message authentication codes and digital 
signatures. It follows RREQ process, same as Ariadne.  
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(m) TIARA (Techniques for Intrusion resistant, Ad Hoc Routing Algorithms): This protocol [28] is used to protect against 
Resource depletion attack, Flow disruption attack, Route hijacking. This algorithm can be used with any other existing 
routing protocol.  
(n) SRP (Secure Routing Protocol): It is an on demand [29] routing protocol. It can discover all possible paths between two 
nodes. The sole assumption of the protocol is that at the beginning, all the nodes share a group key K and can be trusted. 
This algorithm is suitable for various applications like military and emergency situations.  
(o) SPREAD (Security Protocol for Reliable data delivery): It provides data confidentiality [30] security service in routing 
protocols. It uses secret sharing scheme between neighboring nodes to strengthen data confidentiality. It overcomes the 
problem of eavesdropping and colluded attacks.  
(p) AODV-SEC: It is an improved version [31] of SAODV and extension of AODV routing protocol. It uses PKI as a trust 
anchor for node identification using X.509 certificates. X.509 version of AODV-SEC does not scale if the traffic load 
increases. It may be due to the cryptographic mechanisms. 
Each of the above mentioned protocols have their own merits and demerits upon the user requirement a particular 
protocol may be selected, but no protocol is perfect many researches are going in this field to extend the features of 
protocols. 
6  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have tried to inspect the security issues in the mobile ad-hoc networks, due to the mobility and open 
media nature, the mobile ad-hoc networks are much more prone to all kind of security risks, such as information 
disclosure, intrusion, or even denial of service. As a result, the security needs in the mobile ad-hoc networks are much 
higher than those in the traditional wired networks. First we briefly introduced the basic characteristics of mobile ad-hoc 
networks, we then discussed some typical and dangerous vulnerabilities in the mobile ad-hoc networks, most of which are 
caused by the characteristics of the mobile ad-hoc networks such as mobility, constantly changing topology, open media 
and limited battery power. The existence of these vulnerabilities has made it necessary to find some effective security 
solutions to protect mobile ad- hoc networks from all kinds of security risks. Finally, we introduce the current security 
solutions for mobile ad-hoc networks. We start with the discussion on the security criteria in mobile ad-hoc network, which 
acts as a guidance to the security-related research works in this area. While researching on the paper, we found some 
points that could be further explored in the future, such as some aspects of the intrusion detection techniques, we are 
currently exploring deeper in this research area. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Our thanks to the experts who have contributed towards the development of this paper. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Marco Condi, 2003. Body, Personal and Local Ad hoc Wireless Networks, in Book the Handbook of Ad hoc Wireless                                       
Networks (chapter1). CRC press LLC. 
[2] M.Weiser, 1991. The Computer for the Twenty-First Century. Scientific American. 
[3] M.S.Corson, J.P. Maker and J.H. Cernicione, 1999. Internet-based Mobile Ad hoc Networking,IEEE Internet 
Computing, pages 63-70. 
[4] Amitabh Mishra and Ketan M.Nadkarni, 2003. Security in Wireless Ad hoc Networks, in book The Handbook of Ad hoc 
Wireless Networks (chapter 30),CRC press LLC. 
[5] Wenjia Li and Anupam Joshi, Security Issues in Mobile Ad hoc Networks – A Survey. 
[6] Panagotis Papadimitraos and Zygmunt J.Hass, 2003. Securing Mobile Ad hoc Networks,in book The Handbook of Ad 
hoc Wireless Networks (chapter 31) CRC press LLC. 
[7] Data Integrity, from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data integrity. 
[8] Lidong Zhou, Zygmunt J. Hass, 1999. Securing Ad hoc Networks, IEEE Networks special issue on Network Security. 
[9] Y.Hu, A.Perrig and D.Johnson, Packet Leashes, 2003. A Defense against Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Ad hoc 
Networks, in Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM’03. 
[10] A.Perrig,R.Canetti,J.D. Tygar and D.Song, 2000. Efficient Authentication and Signature of Multicast Streams over 
Lossy Channels, In Proceeding of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pages 56-73. 
[11] Latha Tamilselvan. Dr V. Sankarayaran, 2007. Prevention of Blackhole Attack in MANET. The 2
nd
 IEEE international 
Conference on Wireless Broadband and Ultra Wideband Communications(AUS Wireless 2007) India. 
[12] Satoshi Kurosawa,Hidehisa Nakayama,Nei Kato,Abbas Jamalipour,and Yoshiaki Nemoto, 2007. Detecting Blackhole 
Attack on AODV based Mobile Ad hoc Networks by Dynamic Learning Method. International Journal of Network 
Security,vol.5.No.3.pages 338-346. 
ISSN 2319-1236 
 
 
83 | P a g e                                                               J u l y ,  2 0 1 3  
[13] A.Shurman, S.M.Yoo, and S.Park, 2004. Blackhole attack in wireless ad hoc networks.In Proceedings of the ACM 
42
nd
 southeast Conference (ACMSE’04), pages96-97. 
[14] Jim Parker, Discussion Record for the 1
st
 MANET Reading Group 
Meeting.http://logos.cs.umbc.edu/wiki/eb/index.php/February-10%2C_2006. 
[15] Jiejun Kong,Xiaoyan Hong,Yunjung Yi,JoonSang Park,Jun Liu and Mario Gerlay, 2005. A Secure Ad hoc Routing 
Approach Using Localised Self-healing Communities, in Proceedings of the 6
th
 ACM International Symposium on Mobile 
Ad hoc Networking and Computing, pages 254-265,Urbana-Champaign,Illinois. 
[16] Panagiotis Papadimitratos, Zygmunt J. Haas, Secure Message Transmission in Mobile Ad hoc Networks. 
 [17] Panagiotis Papadimitratos, Zygmunt J. Haas, 2003. Secure Link State Routing for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, 
Applications and the Internet Workshops Proceedings. 2003 Symposium on 27-31 Jan. 2003 Page(s):379 - 383 
[18] Yih-Chun Hu ,David B. Johnson , Adrian Perrig “SEAD: secure efficient distance vector routing for mobile wireless ad 
hoc networks”,   
[19] Manel Guerrero Zapata, 2006. Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (SAODV) Routing INTERNET-DRAFT 
draft-guerrero-manetsaodv-06.txt.   
[20] Sonja Buchegger, JeanYves Le Boudec,“Performance Analysis of the CONFIDANT Protocol (Cooperation Of Nodes: 
Fairness In Dynamic Ad hoc Networks)”, MOBIHOC’02 
[21] Abdalla Mahmoud Ahmed Sameh Sherif El-Kassas, “ Reputed Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks Protocol 
(Reputed-ARAN)”©2005 IEEE  
[22] Hu, Yih-Chun, Adrian Perrig, and Dave Johnson. "Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc 
Networks." In Proceedings of the Eighth Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (ACM 
Mobicom), Atlanta, Georgia, September 23 - 28, 2002.  
[23] Jing Liu, Fei Fu, Junmo Xiao and Yang Lu. “Secure Routing for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”,  
[24] Vinod Namboodiri, Manish Agarwal, Lixin Gao, “A Study on the Feasibility of Mobile Gateways for Vehicular Ad-hoc 
Networks”,VANET’04, October 1, 2004, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.  
[25] K. Mandalas, D. Flitzanis, G. F. Marias, P.Georgiadis, “ A Survey of Several Cooperation Enforcement Schemes for 
MANETs”©2005 IEEE  
[26] Mohammed Zeshan, Shoab A. Khan, Ahmad Raza Cheema, Attique Ahmed, “Adding Security against Packet 
Dropping Attack in Mobile Adhoc Networks”2008 IEEE  
[27] Srdjan Capkun, Jean- Pierre Hubaux, “BISS: building secure routing out of an incomplete set of security 
associations”,  2003 IEEE.  
[28] Ranga Ramanujan, Atiq Ahamad, Jordan Bonney, Ryan Hagelstrom, Ken Thurber “Techniques For Intrusion-
Resistant Ad Hoc Routing Algorithms”(C) 2000 IEEE.  
[29] Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, “A Survey of Secure Wireless Ad Hoc Routing” ,May-June 2004IEEE  
[30] Wenjing Lou , Wei Liu, Yuguang Fang, “ SPREAD: Enhancing Data Confidentiality in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks” (C) 
2004 IEEE Security and Privacy  
[31] Stephan Eichler and Christian Roman, “Challenges of Secure Routing in MANETs: A Simulative Approach using 
AODV-SEC”, ©2006 IEEE  
 
 
 
 
